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The redevelopment of Barangaroo, Sydney’s last vacant central-city waterfront site, raised 
high expectations for the public benefits developers would provide in return. The story 
highlights the ways in which the entrepreneurial State’s conflict of interest in the 
redevelopment eroded the quality of the public benefits negotiated in return for a valuable 
public asset. In contrast to previous redevelopment projects, the State used public land and its 
newly-centralised regulatory powers to maximise public revenues from Barangaroo, 
prioritising these over both the public’s interests and, on occasion, those of private 
developers.    
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Planning for the public benefit in the entrepreneurial city: public land speculation and 
financialized regulation   
  
Entrepreneurial states often invoke an image of privately-funded redevelopment that will 
provide significant public benefit at no (apparent) public cost (Shaw 2013; Sagalyn 1997). 
But urban redevelopment partnerships inevitably entail substantial commitments of public 
resources - land, regulatory concessions, risk-sharing agreements – and the promised public 
benefits often mutate into less valuable forms, while projections of risk and return 
demonstrate optimism rather than rigorous analysis (Haila 2008; Shaw 2013). 
Redevelopment projects reflect the financial interests of investors and developers, rather than 
public interests (Halbert and Attuyer 2016; Theurillat et al 2016). Under pressure in an era of 
austerity, governments themselves have incentives to speculate with publically owned land, 
pursuing revenue that counters a shrinking tax base, in what Beswick and Penny (2018) 
describe as “financialised municipal entrepreneurialism;” the line between “public benefit” 
and “public revenue” is increasingly blurred (Van Den Hurk and Siemiatycki 2018).    
How do entrepreneurial states respond to the contradictory imperatives they face in large 
scale urban redevelopment projects, of both providing the expected public benefits, and 
ensuring maximum profitability? What role does planning play in this effort, and what are the 
pressures exerted on the planning process by the public sector’s financialised 
entrepreneurialism?  
 
This paper investigates these questions through close analysis of an urban redevelopment 
project in Sydney, Australia. Sydney has a long history of redevelopment projects intended to 
capitalise on the value of the public assets represented by ex-industrial harbour-front land 
(Searle and Bounds 1999) and commercial development sites in the CBD (Punter 2005). The 
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current redevelopment of a waterfront site along the CBD’s western edge (Barangaroo)i 
exemplifies a targeted approach to improving Sydney’s global competitive position, and 
foreign-source revenues: large footplate office towers for the regional headquarters of finance 
and development firms, hyper-luxury housing aimed at offshore investors, and high-end 
gambling aimed at attracting wealthy international tourists (see Figure 1). As the last vacant 
waterfront central city site, expectations were high for the benefits developers would provide 
in return for the opportunity. Conflicts have focused on the nature of public benefits, the role 
of the State in planning for a development project in which it has a significant financial stake, 
and its management of risks and returns. Efforts to re-define public benefits exacerbated 
legitimacy challenges to planning and to the state’s entrepreneurial role, eroding trust in the 
regulatory framework that claims to protect public interests. The story represents a new 
episode in the financialisationii of urban redevelopment, one in which the State acts as an 
entrepreneur in its own right.   
 
Figure 1 here 
 
The paper begins with a discussion of the rise of entrepreneurial states, the challenges states 
face in negotiating public benefits in redevelopment projects, and debates about the role of 
financialization in shaping urban redevelopment. Section two explains the planning context 
and the basic chronology of the redevelopment. Section three examines the State’s efforts to 
manage risks and returns, and analyses how these have redefined the public benefits the 
project offers, within the multiple forums in which ‘planning’ has occurred. The conclusion 
addresses the questions posed above: how do entrepreneurial states balance the need to 




Research on the entrepreneurial state and urban redevelopment 
In the late 1980s, David Harvey highlighted the transition from the managerial state 
(characterised by a relatively narrow focus on managing the politics of urban development 
and ensuring the provision of basic services), to the entrepreneurial state, organised instead 
around increasing revenues through economic development. Cities battled for position by 
lowering the costs of doing business, investing in “quality of life” assets that enhanced the 
city as a space of consumption, and targeting recruitment of multinational headquarters and 
other strategic command and control functions (Harvey 1989). Writing 25 years after the 
publication of Harvey’s article, Peck (2014) reflects on the ensuing retreat to “pragmatic 
imitation” of the same repertoire of entrepreneurial strategies, within a “competitively 
hollowed-out innovation vacuum” (Peck 2014, 399).  Nevertheless, “[c]ities must act, and be 
seen to act, even if the aspirational reach exceeds the effective grasp” (Peck 2014, 398). The 
gap between the aspirational reach and the effective grasp has motivated a wide range of 
analyses of urban redevelopment. Here, we focus on three questions of most relevance to this 
case. First, what do we mean by “public benefit,” and how has the concept been reconfigured 
in contemporary entrepreneurial states?  Second, what are the problems raised by state 
entrepreneurialism as an approach to providing public benefits? Finally, what role does 
financialisation play in the reconfiguration of urban redevelopment?   
 
Public benefits and common goods 
Wendy Brown argues that concern with public things and the common good has been 
undermined by the ascendancy of neoliberal reason, that “[re]configures both soul and city as 
contemporary firms rather than as polities” (Brown 2015, 27). It is useful to differentiate 
between the common good, a ‘collective and indivisible’ good for communities as a whole, 
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and the public interest, a utilitarian notion of the “aggregate of private interests” (Murphy and 
Fox-Rogers 2015, 232). As Campbell and Marshall (2000) argue, the common good “is 
frequently used as a device to cast an aura of legitimacy over the final resolution of policy 
questions where there are still significant areas of disagreement” (p. 308). Nevertheless, they 
and others (Alexander 2002; Boland, Bronte and Moore 2017; Rydin 2011) argue that the 
common good remains central to justifications of planning, and is the basis for trust in the 
planning system (Tait 2011).  
 
Murphy and Fox-Rogers (2015) challenge this centrality. Their empirical study of how 
planners understand and use the concept suggests that it is neither a legitimiser of planning 
nor a normative guide for practice. Some planners saw the common good as “minimising the 
worst effects of the development process” (p. 239) but most could not define it, nor did they 
believe it was achievable. The urban renaissance of post-industrial cities offer ambivalent 
public goods; extracting “maximum value” from the built environment “changes how the city 
works and for whom it works” (Ward 2003, 209).  Public benefit has been redefined in more 
individualistic terms so that “those that have benefited most … [from urban 
redevelopment]… are the young professionals who populate the waterfront” (Boland, Bronte 
and Muir 2017, 125).  
 
State entrepreneurialism to provide public benefits 
Using publicly owned land as “currency in bargaining for public benefits” often results in 
“deal-specific returns [that] do not get evaluated in the context of competing city priorities, 
and … [that] typically throw off few benefits for those poorer urban areas most in need” 
(Sagalyn 1997, 1968). While the dual role of municipalities as land owners and regulators 
helps drive urban redevelopment, it also puts municipalities in “a biased position that risks 
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undermining the the legitimacy of governmental actions in general, and the planning system 
in particular” (Olsson 2018, 633). The interests of developers and investors limit 
development types to those that will be reliably profitable: luxury housing and retail, and 
large-floor-plate office towers, leading to a global convergence in urban form and a reduction 
of urbanity, rather than development that truly benefits residents (Fainstein 2008, 783). 
Increasingly, developers take the initiative to define the “public interest” on which their 
projects will deliver, rather than responding to public interests defined within communities 
(Galland and Hansen 2012).  
 
Lehrer and Laidley (2008) argue that a significant shift has occurred in planning for urban 
redevelopment, from mega-projects “where the public benefit was celebrated as an 
expression of democratic objectives, …toward a much more competitive environment where 
public benefits are provided in order to attract those who are most desired” (Lehrer and 
Laidley 2008, 799). A crucial part of this reinvention of the urban to attract particular sorts of 
consumers of “public” space, has been the de-politicization of the process compared to earlier 
generations of redevelopment projects. Opposition is stilled by providing fragments of 
“public goods” such as environmental sustainability ratings and affordable housing, that 
effectively “obfuscate their major beneficiaries and ideologies” (Lehrer and Laidley 2008, 
800). Thus, “[t]he legitimation of mega-projects through a rhetoric of environmental 
sustainability and the provision of public amenities makes open debate on their real aims and 
consequences difficult” (Orueta and Fainstein 2008, 764).  
 
Haila’s Helsinki case study exemplifies the political consequences of state 
entrepreneurialism: “it is irrelevant how ‘democratic’ the planning law is and how much 
citizens can ‘participate’ in the planning process if the development process is agreed through 
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contracts” (Haila 2008, 811). The lack of effective democratic oversight may undermine the 
public bargain: Haila argues that the city’s agreement to sell the Kamppi Centre once it was 
profitable, rather than retain ownership and benefit from lease payments over the long term, 
represented a poor deal for the public sector.   
 
Financialisation and the reconfiguration of urban redevelopment 
Financial structures and intermediaries play a vital role in shaping urban redevelopment 
(Halbert and Attuyer 2016; Theurillat et al 2016; Rutland 2010; Guironnet, Attuyer and 
Halbert 2016). But cities are not passive objects on which financial intermediaries impose 
their interests; instead, financial actors are participants in an “unstable and open-ended” 
(Halbert and Attuyer 2016) process of city-making. Investors rely on intermediaries 
(developers, planners, special purpose authorities) to “anchor capital” by producing a built 
environment yielding high returns (Theurillat et al 2016). The outcomes of urban 
redevelopment projects differ based on the relative power of these partners; when the 
financial partners dominate, value is likely to be interpreted from a short-term perspective, 
while projects dominated by local interests are more likely to take a long-term perspective on 
value (Theurillat et al 2016).  
 
Given the indispensable role of financial capital in any sizeable redevelopment, some 
question whether “financialisation” is new in any meaningful sense (Christophers 2015). 
Beswick and Penny (2018, 612) argue, however, that austerity has brought with it strong 
incentives for local states to “financialize…[their] practice …as property speculator,” 
distinguished by a new approach that “view[s] [municipal] land as a quasi-financial asset” (p. 
629). Anguelov, Leitner and Sheppard identify “a subtle but vital shift from local state 
actions seeking to attract private sector investment by subsidizing profitability, to using the 
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logic of finance to select and fund … development projects on the basis of their potential 
return on investment” (2018, 588).   
 
The Sydney case study contributes to these debates by highlighting how the entrepreneurial 
state’s conflicts of interest in the redevelopment reshaped the nature of the public benefits 
negotiated in return for a valuable public asset. The following section explains the case study, 
discussing the state, government, and the planning system in New South Wales, and outlining 
the chronology of the redevelopment of the site. It is important to differentiate the State (of 
New South Wales, an entity of governance) from the ‘state,’ the more abstract concept we 
would use to refer to Australia’s territory, people, and sovereignty (and which is also 
fragmented, along even more complex fault lines). The State government is multi-faceted: the 
party in power, the Premier’s Office, and Cabinet Ministers, do not necessarily speak with 
one voice. Still less is there continuity of interests between governments (as parties lose and 
regain power) and certainly not amongst levels of government. Ministers may have sharply 
opposing interests in the agencies that they head (and the constituencies that they represent). 
What is seen as being in the interests of the Treasury is not (necessarily) in the interests of 
Infrastructure, Housing, or Transport. As a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy, 
“conflicts are managed by a robust Cabinet process where different interests are championed 
by different Ministers” (Sussex and Penn 2011, 9). Figure 2 summarises the structure of the 
executive branch.iii     
 




This section explains the economic and political underpinnings of the redevelopment, and 
outlines the chronology of this process. New South Wales’s overriding concern with enabling 
development stems from its fiscal basis. Australian states do not collect income taxes,iv so are 
reliant on a limited range of revenue sources, amongst which real estate transfer taxes, land 
taxes on income-producing property, and the so-called “sin” taxes, on alcohol and gambling, 
are most important. Given that Australian states have no independent powers of taxation, 
their array of entrepreneurial incentives is limited: regulatory waivers and the contribution of 
public assets are the main levers the state has to encourage economic development. New 
South Wales owns most harbour-front land close to the city centre, and this has been a 
significant asset the State has used to drive development and, I argue, to capture new 
revenue. 
 
States have primary responsibility for land use planning in Australia. They delegate limited 
powers to local governments, and since 2005 New South Wales has been in a continuous 
process of reforming its planning system to limit even those powers, in order to streamline 
development and accommodate growth (McFarland 2011; MacDonald 2015). The State’s 
1979  planning legislation was notable for the strong role it provided for public consultation 
in the development assessment process, and for its progressive concern with environmental 
protection (Williams 2015). This ‘hyper-democracy’ had constrained developers, and the 
Labor government responded to their concerns in 2005 by centralising powers to decide on 
large complex projects in the hands of the Minister for Planning, with minimal requirements 
for public consultation (Searle and Bunker 2010).  
 
Barangaroo exemplifies the consequences of the unconstrained Ministerial discretion and the 
de-democratisation that were argued to be necessary to streamline development and grow the 
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State’s economy. Widespread public dissatisfaction with the effects of this centralisation 
contributed to the electoral victory of the opposition Liberal-National Coalition in 2011 
(McFarland 2011).  A new statute moderated ministerial powers, requiring the Minister to 
take advice from a Planning Assessment Commission in contentious cases .   
 
As a special purpose agency responsible to the Minister for Planning, the Barangaroo 
Delivery Authorityv (the Authority) has interests distinct from the other government agencies 
with important roles in this project – Transport, Environmental Protection, and the Treasury. 
The Authority was established by Parliament in 2009 to “promote, procure, facilitate and 
manage orderly and economic development and use” (NSW Government 2009 Part 1, 3d) of 
the site, including providing necessary infrastructure. For practical purposes, it owns the site, 
but is empowered to lease it to developers, or dedicate parcels for public purposes (parks or 
roads). Its costs are covered by a combination of development contributions (levies), and 
Treasury funds.   
 
Planning occurs at multiple scales in this story. The site is subject to the 2005 Sydney 
Harbour Regional Environmental Plan (REP), which sets explicit planning principles that 
protect a range of public interests.vi The Barangaroo Delivery Authority has wide discretion 
to negotiate with the developers, to ensure the public interest is protected and that 
development “accords with best practice environmental and town planning standards” (NSW 
Government 2009, Part 3, 14 e). Development applications are assessed by the State’s 
Department of Planning, and the Minister for Planning is ultimately responsible for 
approving large scale (‘state significant’) development proposals. Public engagement in this 
assessment process is very limited; under the legislation in place when the original concept 
plan was approved, the Minister had no statutory responsibility to respond to public input in 
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decisions about major projects (and retained wide powers to approve substantial changes to 
previously approved proposals).  
 
Another layer of complexity is added by the conflict-ridden relationship between State 
entities and local governments. The City of Sydney is most directly affected by the 
redevelopment, but does not have any meaningful voice in the negotiations over the site’s 
redevelopment (see endnote v, and City of Sydney 2016). Community activist groups and 
non-governmental organizations (such as the Environmental Defender’s Office and the 
National Trust) have been active critics of the official planning processes. In two cases 
community groups have brought court cases, and thus the Land and Environment Court is 
another arena in which planning has occurred.  
 
The redevelopment of the site was announced in 2003, under a Labor government; it 
continued after 2011 under a Liberal-National Coalition government. By mid-2018, most of 
the southern portion of the site and the Headland Park to the north had been completed; the 
Casino tower is still under construction. Figure 3 shows the site in May 2018, with the 
prominent three towers dominating the waterfront, and the Headland Park to the left of the 
image.  
 
Figure 3 here  
 
The initial concept plan for the site, approved in 2007, drew on elements of the top ranked 
submissions to a 2005 design competition. It reserved half of the 22ha site as open space, and 
proposed more intense (primarily commercial) development for the southern third of the site, 
with building heights stepping up from north to south. There was public enthusiasm for 
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redeveloping the vacant concrete strip; opposition has emerged around the nature of the 
redevelopment. One of the most contentious modifications occurred shortly after Lend Lease 
won the tender for Barangaroo South in 2010, proposing not just significant increases in 
height and density, but also a hotel constructed on a pier in the harbor. Combined with the 
Minister for Planning’s flouting of regulations on contaminated landvii (Kahagalle and Egan 
2011), these perceived ‘behind closed doors’ negotiations galvanized community opposition 
(Moore 2010a; Sussex and Penn 2011). In 2011, the Mayor of the City of Sydney resigned in 
protest from the Board of the Authority, citing “slow release of contractual information and 
secrecy about project finances” and “inadequate and ineffective community consultation” 
(Moore 2010b).   
 
The Liberal / National government that took office in March 2011 inherited a deal that had 
committed the State to substantial transport infrastructure investment, and had attracted 
significant public opposition. While the Labor government had claimed the redevelopment 
would be “cost-free,” with developer contributions covering the costs of the public open 
space and associated infrastructure, the State retained responsibility for major transportation 
investments (BDA 2009). The public information about the agreement with Lend Lease 
described value sharing payments that would supplement the agreed lease payments, 
resulting in an estimated $1bn in developer contributions over 12 years (NSW Auditor-
General 2011). In reality, there was significant confusion about how ‘value’ would be 
estimated for these purposes.viii In 2014, Lend Lease won the case it had brought against the 
Authority regarding the calculation of the ‘value’ to be shared, resulting in a reduction of 
approximately $400m in developer payments (NSW Auditor-General 2015). This created a 
significant cash flow problem for the Authority, and intensified the State’s interests in 
maximizing returns on the remainder of the site.  
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Perhaps fortuitously for the State (and the Authority), in 2012 Crown Resorts had submitted 
an unsolicited proposal to develop the hotel tower to include an exclusive casino (Crown 
Resorts and Office of the Premier 2013). Opposition to a second casino in Sydney 
exacerbated concern about the construction of the hotel on a pier in the harbour. The State 
Parliament approved the gaming license in late 2013, but stipulated that the casino must be 
relocated to a site on the north end of Barangaroo South, a location set aside for a park (NSW 
Government 2013). In the eighth significant modification to the original concept, the height 
of the hotel was increased from 160m to 275m, and Hickson Park was relocated to the rear of 
the hotel (see Figure 1). Public (and local government) protest over this was sufficient to 
require an independent evaluation by the Planning Assessment Commission in 2016.    
  
By 2015, the Headland Park had opened to the public, as had the first of the commercial 
towers on Barangaroo South. The tender for the final portion of the site, Barangaroo Central, 
was deferred until after the announcement of a Barangaroo station for the new Metro rail line 
in 2015, and master-planning for the Central portion of the site was underway in mid-2018. 













Managing risk and return while providing public benefits 
Public benefits from the redevelopment 
The initial vision for the site included a major waterfront park, balancing the Botanic Gardens 
to the East of the city centre with a new park to the West. The vision maintained two of 
Sydney’s strongest planning principles -  the preservation or restoration of harbour headlands 
as green space, and the development of a continuous, publicly accessible waterfront walkway 
along the entire harbour. These principles make an explicit connection to the public benefit: 
“...the public good has precedence over the private good whenever and whatever change is 
proposed for Sydney Harbour or its foreshores...” (NSW Government 2005 Part 1, 2b).  The 
construction of the headland park, and cultural facilitiesx reflecting the economic, social, and 
cultural contributions of Sydney’s Indigenous population, represented valuable common 
goods for all Sydney residents (while also benefitting the tourists, office workers, and 
residents that Barangaroo attracts).  
 
Other elements of the public realm raise more troubling questions about the extent to which 
the common good has been protected and enhanced. The original urban design concept 
placed the tallest buildings at the southern end of the site, and limited their floor-plates to 
protect views. As built, the office towers have bulky floor-plates of 2,500sqm, and they step 
up from south to north (culminating in the 71 story Casino hotel), maximizing 
overshadowing (PAC 2016c, 27; NSW Department of Planning and Environment 2017). The 
developed gross floor area has increased by nearly 50% (see Figure 4), and the quality of the 
open space has been compromised by increasing development intensity.  
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Figure 4 here 
The relocation of the hotel / casino to a site set aside for a public park undermined the 
usefulness and appeal of the space, as the Planning Assessment Commission argued:  
“In exchange for the development of [the hotel tower], the current proposal offers up the new 
Hickson Park—a handkerchief style city park above basement parking land-locked to the east 
‘behind’ the [hotel’s] built form, and overshadowed for much of the day. In effect the 
location of the park presents as a consequence of the siting of this [hotel] development rather 
than as a strategic allocation of public open space.” (PAC 2016c, 4).  
The Commission noted that the Barangaroo Delivery Authority had ignored similar criticisms 
made by its own Design Advisory Panel. To ameliorate aspects of the problems of 
overshadowing and lack of visual connection with the water, the Commission recommended 
restricting the development allowed on the adjacent lot (part of Barangaroo Central) (PAC 
2016c, 21). The Commission also pointed out that nearly one third of the waterfront walkway 
was designated for bars and restaurants, and thus would be open only to paying customers: 
“…the promenade [in front of the hotel] is most likely to read as a forecourt to the building 
rather than as public realm.” (PAC 2016a 6). Despite significant reservations about the 
hotel’s likely impact on the public realm and the foreshore, the Commission concluded it did 
not have the power to change its location, because this was a condition of the Casino license 
legislation.  
A community group, Millers Point Fund Inc., challenged the Commission’s decision, arguing 
that it had paid more regard to Casino licensing laws than to planning laws. The judge found 
no grounds for the suit (EDO 2016), but the case highlighted the lack of transparency 
perpetuated by Ministerial powers to approve concept plan modifications without public 
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consultation (EDO 2017). The suit also illustrates the level of public frustration with a 
planning process that happens through contracts and business licensing processes rather than 
through public engagement and open negotiation. The 2011 review of the redevelopment 
planning process had found that “consultation about the project has been more a selling of a 
decision than a genuine effort at community engagement to improve the outcome, and that 
there is a lack of transparency in relation to the project” (Sussex and Penn 2011, 9). Despite 
the incoming government’s efforts to rebuild legitimacy, this criticism remained valid in 
2016.  
Other public benefits claimed for the development less clearly respond to the public’s 
interests than to those of the developers, tenants, or investors. The Authority (and Lend 
Lease) emphasise the triple-bottom line approach to sustainability as a key source of public 
benefits. While the Climate Positive development speaks to the City of Sydney’s Green 
Global and Connected positioning (City of Sydney 2015), it does little to address the 
environmental and social challenges of the sprawling car dependent metropolitan region. 
High sustainability ratings are very attractive to corporate tenants and investors (Eicholtz, 
Kok, and Quigley 2010), and have become ubiquitous in the new premium-grade office space 
market, not just in Sydney. In this instance too, sustainability may be “another imaginary too 
easily enlisted to the project of capitalisation and commodification of land” (Shaw 2013, 
2160).  
The transit accessibility of the development is excellent, but the bulk of these benefits were 
funded and provided by the State. Transport for New South Wales covered the $45m cost of 
moving the ferry wharves a few hundred meters north, and $248m of the $286m cost of 
upgrading the nearest station and the pedestrian connection to the site (NSW Auditor-General 
2015). The major new rail line that will serve the site (Sydney Metro) is fully funded by the 
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State, and there was an opportunity cost to aligning it to serve Barangaroo in preference to 
other less well-served parts of the inner city.  
In the context of Sydney’s severe affordable housing crisis, contributing 3% of residential 
space to key worker housing is ineffectual at best. The Commission’s assessment estimates 
this will result in 39 onsite and 25 offsite homes (PAC 2016c, 23). Set alongside the 
estimated 14,300 commuters to the site by 2023, many of whom will work in retail, facilities 
maintenance, and food service, there is little basis for arguing the development will address 
the significant impact it will have on affordable housing demand, let alone contribute to 
public benefit.   
Managing risk and returns 
Barangaroo is vulnerable to several categories of risk – financial, market, political, and 
regulatory factors all had the potential to derail the redevelopment. In most public private 
partnerships, the public sector assumes the less manageable and quantifiable risks, and the 
returns it receives are often in the form of longer term economic regeneration. In this case, 
the public-sector entities involved have actively tried to minimize the effects of financial risk 
by controlling regulatory risk, and the State has negotiated returns in the form of short to 
medium term guaranteed revenues.  
 Thus far, the redevelopment has benefited from a rapidly inflating property market (Knight 
Frank 2017). Market risk has had positive rather than negative outcomes. Financial risks have 
been more difficult to manage. While it is difficult to assign ultimate culpability for the 
$400m over-estimation of value-sharing payments, it is unclear why the Authority expected 
that cash-flows from a parent company to cover construction expenses could be interpreted as 
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progress payments (the resignation of the Authority’s CEO the day before the announcement 
that Lend Lease had won its lawsuit, may be only coincidental).   
The costs of remediation have escalated from the $112m estimated in 2011 to what appears to 
be a cost of $400m as of late 2018, far exceeding the $78m the agency had set aside for 
contingencies (NSW Auditor-General 2011; McNab 2018). Initial estimates of cleanup costs 
were based on assumptions that in-situ treatment and re-use of contaminated soil would be 
possible. This risk might have been managed if the Authority had investigated appropriate 
solutions much earlier. Under the Voluntary Management Plan approved for the site in 2009, 
pilot tests of this approach were to have been completed by September 2011. After a delay of 
more than 5 years, the State’s Environmental Protection Authority issued a legally 
enforceable Management Order in early 2016, with the pilot test reports due in early 2017 
(EPA 2016). This is the point at which the Authority appears to have recognized the likely 
full costs of the remediation.  While cleanup costs are covered by the ‘polluter pays’ 
principle, the previous occupant disputed its liability in the courts, and an undisclosed share 
of those costs will be borne by the previous occupant (Jemena), and the developer (Lend 
Lease).   
The Authority’s deficit has crept steadily upwards. By 2017, the Auditor General singled out 
the agency as having a liquidity level of concern, at 0.24 (i.e. there is a 1:4 ratio between 
current assets and short-term obligations). Its total debt was $735m in 2017 (Auditor-General 
2017, 12). As an agency of State government, and the principal entity responsible for 
delivering public benefits, the Authority faces a significant conflict of interest. The 
Authority’s precarious financial position intensified the need to increase development returns, 
and thus the pressure for maximum regulatory flexibility the Authority has exerted on other 
government agencies.   
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One example of this is the Authority’s response to the Planning Assessment Commission’s 
2016 recommendations. The Authority objected that the enlargement of Hickson Park, and 
provision of view corridors down to the water, increased the “non-developable” area of the 
site and limited the development envelope on part of Barangaroo Central. The Commission’s 
recommendation posed a ‘material risk’ to the government (according to the Barangaroo 
Delivery Authority), because it undermined the development potential for Barangaroo 
Central (PAC 2016b, 4). The Authority had issued a tender for development on the central 
portion of the site that was clearly designed to push the envelope on the intensity of 
development that would be acceptable. The approved concept plan limited Barangaroo 
Central development to 59,225sqm, while the tender documents encouraged developers to 
consider an upper limit of 150,000sqm (PAC 2016b). The Authority appeared confident that 
development intensity would be continuously revised upwards.  
For similar reasons, the Authority reversed its original position on the Casino tower uses; 
apartments were specifically excluded from the project in the 2013 development deed, in 
order to respond to public concerns about the scale and bulk of the building. But in 2015 this 
restriction was reversed, with 48% of the much-larger building approved for apartments. The 
justification was that with the relocation of the tower to the land, “the apartment component 
was now necessary to make the casino and hotel viable” (Davies 2015). The Authority 
defended its about-face, arguing that “…the authority retained absolute discretion in relation 
to its approval as land owner of any proposal” (Barangaroo Delivery Authority spokesperson 
quoted in Davies 2015). The public benefit the Authority had claimed to be defending in 
2013 had been sacrificed in order to maximise development returns, and thus the 
contributions it receives, to cover the higher costs for which it was liable.  
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However, the projected returns on the redevelopment are very positive from the perspective 
of total State revenues. Transaction taxes on the properties sold, and land taxes on the 
income-producing properties, are substantial. In addition to a $100m upfront Casino licensing 
fee, the agreement with Crown guarantees the State a further $1bn in gaming revenues and 
taxes over the first 15 years of the Casino’s operation (Office of the Premier 2013).  There 
are of course significant risks associated with an economic development strategy based on 
gambling revenues. The arrest of 15 Crown employees in the Chinese government’s 
crackdown on offshore gambling has been linked with declines in revenues for Crown’s Perth 
and Melbourne ‘high-roller’ casinos, of 39% and 47% respectively (Pascoe 2017). Crown 
itself is divesting from several international holdings. The inclusion of apartments priced up 
to AU$40m may be even more important to making the development ‘viable’ in this 
environment.  
 
Protecting the basis for these high values appeared to be another interest shared by the 
Authority, Lend Lease, and Crown; in meeting with the Planning Assessment Commission on 
6 May 2016, the Barangaroo Delivery Authority confirmed “the agreements in place with 
Lend Lease and Crown require consultation with these parties, should there be any changes to 
Barangaroo Central that could affect sight lines to iconic views [of the Opera House and 
Harbour Bridge]” (PAC 2016d). However, the prospect of additional development revenues 
from a denser, higher-rise Barangaroo Central have undermined these commitments, and the 
developers are now suing the Authority for reneging on the agreement to preserve views 
(Toscano 2018).  
 
Political risks have been more difficult to manage. In 2010 the Labor Minister for Planning 
had approved not only large increases in development intensity (without appropriate 
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independent advice), but also early site works without a Remediation Action Plan in place (as 
State Environmental Planning Policy required). Australians for Sustainable Development 
filed a lawsuit against the Minister and Lend Lease, but shortly before the judgment was due, 
the Minister changed the policy regulations to exempt Barangaroo from the law (Land and 
Environment Court 2011; Kahagalle and Egan 2011). This was widely condemned, and fed 
the perception that decisions made about Barangaroo were unconstrained by the democratic 
process.  
The new Minister for Planning sought to distance his government from the errors of the 
previous government. He commissioned an independent review to broker a mediated solution 
to the court case, investigating both the specific planning processes and also the claims made 
by proponents and opponents. The terms of reference for the review were framed in 
unmistakably neoliberal terms: “The major issue for Lend Lease at present is the urgent need 
to proceed with the planning and development … in order to confirm investor confidence in 
the project …Lend Lease’s interests coincide with the interests of the Government, which 
wants to assure the world community that Sydney is open for business” (Sussex and Penn 
2011, 3). The review concluded that while the previous government had made “…a raft of 
small and large mistakes and mishandlings, which taken together, have created an air of crisis 
around the development” (Sussex and Penn 2011, 8), no new evidence of corruption had been 
revealed. The review did recommend a number of governance changes, including 
establishing a joint planning committee between the Authority and the City of Sydney, and 
separating the roles of the Minister for Planning and the Minister for Barangaroo to manage 
conflicts of interest better (Sussex and Penn 2011, 9). The first of these was followed 
(although with little apparent impact on the City’s influence on the development process) 
(City of Sydney 2016); the second was not, and questions remain around the State’s conflicts 
of interest as both regulator and profiteer.  
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Most importantly, the Coalition government’s limitations on Ministerial powers (described 
above) were intended to rebuild trust and legitimacy. But the Crown Casino licensing 
decision and the substantial increases in the tower’s height and bulk undermined these 
efforts, and by 2016 community advocacy groups resorted to the Courts once more, this time 
challenging the independence and competence of the Planning Assessment Commission (a 
key element of the Coalition’s efforts to legitimize centralized planning decisions). The State 
has not been able to manage political risks effectively.      
Conclusions 
How do entrepreneurial states manage the contradictions they face in large scale urban 
redevelopment projects, between providing the expected public benefits, and maximizing 
profitability?  The story recounted above shows how promises of ‘public benefit’ have been 
subsumed by the State’s interests in ameliorating risk and increasing development returns. 
The major public benefits were the additions to Sydney’s waterfront parkland. While parts of 
this were delivered as promised, other parts have been compromised by the Barangaroo 
Delivery Authority’s need to compensate for reduced developer contributions, and the State’s 
interests in the revenue to be gained from the Casino hotel. Another element of the public 
benefit is the impact of urban design decisions on the public realm, including on adjacent 
sites. The Minister for Planning’s more or less unconstrained power to approve substantial 
changes to the project’s concept plan without public input, resulted in much greater 
overshadowing impacts.  
The public’s interests in the environmental impacts of the development of a contaminated site 
were threatened by the regulatory exemptions (although these were later withdrawn). The 
redevelopment, as we might expect based on experience elsewhere - including Melbourne 
Docklands, as Shaw (2013) demonstrates - has not been ‘cost-free.’ The Authority’s 
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negotiation of development contributions to cover the public costs committed was flawed, 
and State revenues will have to cover costs that should have been borne by developers. Other 
benefits claimed for the development (the 6-star sustainability rating, transport accessibility, 
and affordable housing contributions) involve questionable tradeoffs. The first two provide 
substantial benefits to developers, tenants, and investors, the second represents a public rather 
than a private contribution that involves an unexamined opportunity cost, and the third offers 
little impact on the problem it claims to address.  
The Barangaroo Delivery Authority, the Minister for Planning, and ultimately the Premier’s 
Office, have a conflict of interest that has undermined their role in protecting public benefits. 
They have bargained away public benefits not, primarily, to benefit private developers, but to 
maximize public revenue. Often, developers do benefit, but not necessarily. The Authority’s 
reneging on commitments to preserve views from the Barangaroo South towers demonstrates 
its pursuit of higher returns to the State, at the expense of the highest returns to the private 
developers involved.  
Barangaroo has been a highly ‘financialized’ project, in two senses: it has served to ‘anchor 
capital’ (Theurillat et al 2016) by remaking the built environment to the benefit of investors 
and developers, but it has also used public land speculatively, to generate substantial financial 
returns for the State government. Maximizing development contributions, the casino revenue, 
and land and transaction taxes, overshadowed the public’s interests in effective development 
regulation and a high quality public realm. Increasing development intensity has benefited the 
State as much as it has the developers, and on occasion the State has clearly prioritized its 
interests over those of developers. In this case study, the State indeed appears to be 
reconfigured as “contemporary firm rather than … polit[y]” (Brown 2015), at the expense of 
the common good it protects in principle.  
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What role has planning played in this effort, and what are the pressures exerted on the 
planning process by the State’s financialized entrepreneurialism? A crucial pre-requisite 
enabling the State’s use of regulatory powers in the service of its speculative redevelopment 
ventures was the centralization of power in the hands of the Minister for Planning, 
constrained only by the Courts. In addition to the insulation of the development regulation 
process through private contracts and business licensing laws, and the exclusion of city 
governments, this ensured the State had the power it needed to drive redevelopment (and 
bargain over benefits) to maximize its revenues. However, this power is fragile: the erosion 
of the promised public benefits has intensified legitimacy challenges to a de-democratized 
planning system (MacDonald 2018). It has further damaged trust that the institutions of 
planning and development regulation will protect the public’s interests in environmental 
safety, quality design, fair and consistent applications of law and regulations, and trust in the 
fiscal competence of the State.  
While the story supports Lehrer and Laidley’s (2008) argument that the public benefits 
offered by waterfront redevelopment are aimed at a narrow segment of ‘consumers’, in this 
case the “obfuscation” of the limited public benefits delivered has been less successful. 
Community groups and local governments that have been excluded from the process have 
been vocal critics of the redevelopment’s impacts on urban form. Legitimacy  challenges 
have been exacerbated by the insulation of the planning process from democratic engagement 
or the need to respond to well-grounded critiques, including those from the local 
governments most affected by the development. But these challenges have not derailed the 
project; instead, they amplify the “unstable and open-ended” process of city-making that 
Halbert and Attuyer (2016) diagnose. The “state-executed, speculative development and 
financialization of public land” (Beswick and Penny 2018, 612) exemplified in this story may 
represent a new era in urban redevelopment: one where ‘entrepreneurial states’ morph into 
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‘quasi-firms,’ concerned with public benefits only to the extent that these are perceived to 
justify the regulatory waivers (and other public assets) necessary to maximize public 
revenues. The governance reforms necessary to resolve these conflicts of interest – greater 
financial and regulatory transparency, improved democratic engagement in negotiating public 
benefits, and effective checks and balances – are easy to prescribe, but very challenging to 
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Figure 1: Barangaroo Site Plan, 2017.  
 
Source: Barangaroo Delivery Authority 2017.  
 
Figure 2: New South Wales Government: Structure of the Executive Branch 
 
Source: NSW Parliament n.d. 
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Figure 4: Height and bulk in concept plan revisions, 2007 to 2016 
 














i Barangaroo is named for a woman of the Eora nation (Karskens 2014).  
ii  Financialisation may be succinctly defined as “shorthand for the growing influence of 
capital markets, their intermediaries, and processes in contemporary economic and political 
life” (Pike & Pollard, 2010, p.29, quoted in Ward, 2017, p. 1). 
iii The executive implements laws passed by the two-tier legislature, which are interpreted 
and enforced by an independent judiciary. 
iv Taxation powers are held by the Commonwealth government.  
v  The Board of the Barangaroo Delivery Authority is composed of the organisation’s CEO, 
the Secretary of the NSW Treasury, a nominee of the City of Sydney Council (approved by 
the Minister for Planning) and up to four additional Ministerial appointees, one of whom is 
selected to serve as the Chairperson of the Board (NSW Government 2009). Since the Mayor 
of the City of Sydney resigned from the Board in 2010 (see Moore 2010b), that position has 
remained vacant. Other affected local governments (in particular the Inner West Council, 
which includes the peninsula directly opposite the redevelopment site) are not represented on 
this Board.  
vi In addition to principles aimed at protecting and enhancing hydrology and the natural 
environment, several principles are directly relevant to the Barangaroo redevelopment: 
“development that is visible from the waterways or foreshores is to maintain, protect and 
enhance the unique visual qualities of Sydney Harbour” (Part 2, 13, f); “the number of 
publicly accessible vantage points for viewing Sydney Harbour should be increased” (Part 2, 
13, g); development should “avoid or minimise disturbance of acid sulfate soils” (Part 2, 13, 
l); and, “public access to and along the foreshore should be increased, maintained and 
improved” (Part 2, 14, b). 
vii The site is contaminated from a century of use as a gasworks, and by fill including asbestos 
(BIRRP 2011). Proposals to excavate, treat, and re-use contaminated soil for the Headland 
Park raised public health concerns (Davies 2010). 
viii The dispute centred on whether equity payments made to the project by Lend Lease’s 
capital arm constituted ‘financing’ payments or ‘progress’ payments (in which case they 
would count as revenue, inflating the value of improved land) (Lindsay 2014). 
ix The project also has supporters, beyond the development industry: visitors from other parts 
of the city clearly enjoy the Headland Park and the waterfront, but they are not necessarily 
vocal.  
x The facility is used for art and historical exhibitions 
 
 
 
                                                      
